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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Unprepared 
President Putin addressed Russia’s shocked population following the terrible 
resolution of the hostage taking of school children, their parents and teachers in 
North Ossetia. Rather than take the opportunity to calm and reassure the 
population or focus on reptilian traits in the perpetrators, threatening to bomb 
them in their "outhouses" and vowing revenge, Putin took a longer view of 
events, focusing on the foundational shifts and detritus of empire caused by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
"We all hoped for change, change for the better. But many of the changes that 
took place found us unprepared. () [W]e need to admit that we did not fully 
understand the complexity and the dangers of the processes at work in our own 
country and the world. () [W]e proved unable to react adequately. We showed 
ourselves to be weak. And the weak get beaten." (1) 
 
He went on to assert that the vulnerability of the fledgling Russian state of the 
1990s allowed those who believed that Russia "still represents a threat to them" 
to attack by various means, including terrorism. (2) The frequency of the recent 
attacks (including the airplane explosions and the Moscow subway bombing), 
along with the barbarity of this particular incident however, led Putin to claim that 
Russia is in the midst of a "total, cruel and full-scale war," which requires the 
mobilization of the entire nation as well as the creation of a "more effective 
security system" and "an organized and united civil society." (3) 
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Reaction to and analysis of Putin’s address generally presumed the creation of a 
security services über-agency to coordinate threat response, crisis management 
and inter-agency cooperation, particularly for the North Caucasus region. Gleb 
Pavlovsky, President of the Effective Policy Fund and onetime Kremlin pet 
ideologue, identified the general problem confronting authorities as "the 
discrepancy between our political system, on the one hand, and the state of 
society and its security needs, on the other." (4) Pavlovsky’s remedy requires 
"restoring the political system described in the Constitution. Today it is paralyzed 
and seized by anonymous power groups, which are responsible for corruption 
both in the power structures and in politics. (5) 
 
It now appears that prognosticators were correct: President Putin, in a special 
government meeting on September 13, urged that special focus be given the 
creation of a unified vertical power structure, with regional governments 
eschewing elections to their executive branches in favor of selection by 
legislative assemblies. (6) He further proposed dropping the system of single-
mandate constituencies, by which half of the Duma is elected, relying instead on 
party-based proportional representation — convenient for a President who 
effectively controls the major parliamentary parties. Apparently, Putin recognized 
the potential criticism inherent in his proposals and spent some time in his 
address on the 13th describing the "Public Chamber" that would provide for the 
input of citizens and serve as "a platform for dialogue." (7) Unfortunately, an 
amorphous discussion club, even if it has the right to criticize the security 
services, does not approach the right of citizens to elect representatives to a 
legislative body, which is actually permitted to initiate legislation. 
 
In addition to the proposed electoral reforms, Putin created a Federal 
Commission on the North Caucasus, to be headed by the Presidential 
Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Southern Federal District. He promptly appointed his 
right-hand reformer, Dmitri Kozak, to the post. (8) The appointment of Kozak 
suggests that Kremlin policy vis-à-vis the Caucasus will be approached with long-
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term, strategic interests in mind, rather than heavy-handed and vengeance 
driven security actions. Kozak, who is responsible for Putin-era efforts at judicial 
reform, regional reform and the well-devised, but poorly implemented, 
bureaucratic restructuring has developed a pattern of tackling issues of 
corruption and negligence through institutional avenues, (rather than the 
personality-centric efforts of the Yel’tsin years), albeit with a mottled record of 
success. 
 
Putin also touched blood-curdlingly often on the need for stricter security 
measures: against the financial channels of terrorists, against those who "hide 
behind religious, nationalist and other slogans," and proactively on the need to 
preempt terrorists "to destroy them, so to speak, in their own lair. And, if the 
situation requires it, to get them from abroad." (9) 
 
It may also be valuable to keep in mind further comments by Gleb Pavlovsky, 
who stepped further into the fray than has Putin, but voiced what most fear are 
this president’s views. "We cannot tolerate the fact that terrorists are referred to 
as "rebels" in the official documents of our partners. We must insist that any, 
even token support of terrorists, is an unfriendly act of complicity. () A new 
level of reasonable cruelty (though not aggressiveness) is needed with regard to 
our neighbors. One cannot ignore the fact that the terrorists came to Ossetia 
after Mr. Saakashvili unfroze the Georgia-Ossetia conflict. Previously, it did not 
occur to any terrorist to go in there." (10) 
 
As much sympathy as the attack in Beslan may elicit in us all, it bears 
remembering that Russia must not be allowed to rationalize expansion and 
hostility toward the post-Soviet independent states on its borders, even though 
they invoke the War on Terror as justification. 
 
Sergei Markov, President of the Political Studies Institute, anticipates new acts of 
terrorism in the near future. He highlighted the increasingly international nature of 
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terrorism in Russia, worrying that, despite rhetoric to the contrary; the security 
services have focused primarily on "Chechen separatism" and have ignored the 
"new military-political force" that has "turned the Chechen separatists into 
mercenaries." (11) 
 
Stanislav Belkovsky, Head of the National Strategy Institute calls both for a 
radical restructuring of the political elite with the strengthening of executive 
power, and a reconcentration of authority for the security services in the re-
creation of "a sort of analogue to the KGB of the former USSR." (12) 
 
Some of the country’s most insightful journalists, Masha Gessen, Yulia Latynina, 
Pavel Felgenhauer among others, chose to scrutinize the events in Beslan and 
its aftermath not in light of President Putin’s address, but rather by the 
administration’s actions. Whether the framework was the willful disregard of 
history and Russia’s record of abuses in Chechnya, or the "monstrous 
incompetence" of the political, security and military officials, their analyses 
seemed to share an unsettling conclusion, best summed by Felgenhauer, 
"Terrorists in Russia display a blatant disregard for human life, and the Kremlin 
does the same." (13) 
 
While Russian commentators were left to extrapolate from Putin’s remarks to 
predict a course of behavior, foreign analysts were treated to a special three-hour 
session with the President. While a transcript has yet to be published, it is clear 
that the journalists came away from the meeting with a clear message for 
western leaders: Criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya, in the wake of 
Beslan, is no longer acceptable behavior. Russia must be accepted as a partner 
in the war on terrorism and its enemies must not be given comfort by word or 
deed. The suggestion that Russia should have negotiated with the hostage-
takers in Beslan generated an angry analogy from Putin: "I don't advise you to 
meet Bin Laden, invite him to Brussels and NATO or the White House, hold talks 
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with him, and let him dictate what he wants so that he will then leave you alone. 
But you tell us that we should talk to everyone, including child-killers." (14) 
 
Putin, his new Chief of the General Staff, Yuri Baluyevsky, and Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov have all made clear that they intend to make use of a doctrine of 
pre-emptive strike. The circumstances and target of such a strike may be 
unclear, as yet, but Georgia and its troublesome Pankisi Gorge, surfaces 
repeatedly as a possible mark. Disturbingly, the issue of the identity (nationality 
and financing) of the Beslan hostage-takers seems to have taken a back seat to 
plans for retribution. 
 
While U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has spoken out about President 
Putin’s program to realign the "vertical of executive power" in Russia, it would be 
far more edifying to see a strong U.S. stance on the territorial integrity of the 
sovereign states of the former Soviet Union. If sovereignty still obtains in the 
international community, then foreign interference in independent states is a 
more appropriate topic for criticism then domestic authoritarianism, however 
disconcerting. It bears noting that before the United States attacked Afghanistan 
in search of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, proof was offered to (and accepted 
by) neighboring countries, such as Pakistan, that our targets were indeed the 








(4) Izvestiya, 6 Sep 04; Official Kremlin International Broadcast via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Ibid. 
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(10) Izvestiya, Ibid. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) "Disregard for Human Life," by Pavel Felgenhauer in The Moscow Times. 7 
Sep 04 via Lexis-Nexis; "What drives the separatists to commit such terrible 
outrages?" by Masha Gessen in slate.com, 04 Sep 04 via Johnson’s Russia List, 
#8537, 7 Sep 04; "Heroism and Monstrous Incompetence," by Yulia Latynina in 
The Moscow Times, 8 Sep 04 via JRL, #8537. 




Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
The Putin administration relies heavily on its special forces units, particularly in 
the most serious situations, such as the Beslan school siege, where they were 
dispatched to rescue the hostages. Although Russian leadership claims that they 
performed admirably are clearly unsupportable in light of the tremendous loss of 
life, these units are developing a track record, in terms of both players and 
tactics, that bears careful analysis. 
 
What happened? 
Early in the siege, President Vladimir Putin cut short his holiday and returned to 
Moscow to meet with members of his security team, including FSB director 
Nikolai Patrushev and MVD (Interior) Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev. (1) Shortly 
 7
after, Putin sent Patrushev and Nurgaliyev to Beslan, but they were not visibly 
active during the rest of the siege. Instead, former Ingush President Ruslan 
Aushev and Dr. Leonid Roshal, a key figure during the Moscow theater siege in 
2002, assumed roles as negotiators, although it is unclear whether they 
represented the government. The government official sent to contact the 
hostage-takers was Aslambek Aslakhanov, President Putin's spokesman and 
adviser on Chechnya, but he did not arrive until after the firefight had begun. (2) 
Regional security service head Valeri Andreyev appeared to be the most visible 
government official, although his statements were reminiscent of Mohammed 
Saeed al-Sahaf, the infamous Iraqi information minister, since he severely 
underreported the number of hostages to the local press and citizens, who 
almost certainly were aware of the higher figures. (3) 
 
Security forces, including local police forces, members of the Russian army, and 
the FSB Alfa and Vympel units (and possibly also members of the Interior 
Ministry’s OMON unit) quickly surrounded the besieged school. (4) The small 
town saw many of its citizens surrounding the school as well, some even armed 
with personal weapons. On-scene negotiators talked to the hostage-takers, but 
only 26 women and children were released, on the afternoon of 2 September (5) 
Although President Putin stated that his main aim was to save the lives of the 
hostages, it seemed a difficult task to pursue especially given his policy of 
absolutely no negotiations with terrorists. 
 
The siege quickly settled into a stand-off, with the hostage-takers keeping all 
hostages in the center of the school gymnasium surrounded by explosives set to 
go off with simple foot-triggers, or other mechanisms designed for easy activation 
should the building be stormed or gassed, as special forces notoriously had done 
in the Moscow NORD-OST theater siege. Hostage-takers also brought along 
dogs, presumably as an added defense against such an attack. (6) 
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The stand-off broke on the morning of 3 September shortly after the rebels 
agreed to allow the bodies of the dead to be removed. It is unclear precisely how 
the siege broke: either armed civilians, perhaps out of frustration, fired first, 
causing the hostage-takers to believe they were being stormed and then to 
detonate the explosives; or the hostage-takers unintentionally detonated one of 
the explosives, causing the civilians and special forces to assume the hostages 
were in immediate peril, which sent them charging at the school. (7) In either 
case, pandemonium prevailed within and outside the school, characterized by a 
wild firefight of indiscriminate shooting. When the violence ended some ten hours 
later, over 350 hostages had been killed along with most if not all of the 30-plus 
hostage-takers, and hundreds more had been injured. Well over a dozen special 
forces troops were killed as well, including the commander of the Alfa unit. (8) 
 
Analysis 
By the measure President Putin set early in the siege–saving the hostages–the 
actions of the government certainly were not crowned by success. In terms of 
capturing or killing the hostage-takers, he may have found grounds for 
consolation. But neither Putin’s aim of enhancing his country’s security nor the 
separatists' declared aim of enhancing the prospect of Chechen independence, 
was furthered in this action, making it a tragedy from every perspective. 
 
It is useful to trace the development of the mass hostage-taking tactic in Russia 
over the past decade to see how it has evolved and where it is likely to be 
headed. The first such event on record was the 1995 siege of the Budyonnovsk 
city hospital by Chechen separatists. Hostage-takers held upwards of 2,000 
hostages in a multi-day siege in which Russian security forces repeatedly and 
unsuccessfully attempted to storm the hospital. Shamil Basaev, Chechen rebel 
commander and leader of this siege, demanded that Russian forces be removed 
immediately from Chechnya or all hostages would be killed. He stated further that 
he had no apprehension about dying himself, and neither did any of his cohorts. 
Negotiators secured the release of over 200 hostages at one point, but fighting 
 9
followed again shortly. As a stand-off developed, Russian Prime Minister Viktor 
Chernomyrdin personally called Basaev, appealing for a solution (these 
telephone negotiations were broadcast to a side audience). In the end, all 
remaining hostages were released and the hostage-takers themselves were 
allowed to escape to Chechnya. Altogether, over 100 hostages were killed. (9) 
 
Approximately six months later, separatists took over another hospital in Kizlyar, 
with another 2,000 hostages. The outcome was similar, this time 23 hostages 
were killed and all the hostage-takers returned to Chechnya. (10) 
 
In 1996 a de facto peace agreement with Chechnya was reached that fell apart 
after several years with the beginning of the Second Chechen War. In 2002, over 
40 Chechen separatists took over a Moscow theater during a crowded 
performance, taking over 700 hostages. This three-day siege featured similar 
demands for the removal of Russian troops from Chechnya in exchange for the 
hostages. This time, hostage-takers rigged bombs around the theater to preclude 
special forces from storming the building. These special forces, specifically the 
FSB Alfa unit, were reported to be practicing on a replica theater building during 
the stand-off in preparation for a siege. In a rather innovative approach, Russian 
special forces pumped a gas into the theater to incapacitate the hostages (and 
the captives) before taking the building. While this ended the stand-off, it resulted 
in the loss of approximately 140 of the hostages (mostly due to the effects of the 
gas), and most or all of the hostage-takers. (11) 
 
With each of these events, including the school siege at Beslan, both hostage-
takers and would-be rescuers appear to have taken lessons from previous 
events. The early events may have taught the hostage-takers that should the 
primary plan fail, it was possible to negotiate an escape. They may have taken 
note also of the popularity of the attacks among many Chechens–being able to 
take the battle to Russia proper may have been intended as a morale booster. 
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It is likely the Beslan hostage-takers paid particular attention to events at the 
Moscow theater, perhaps the least successful hostage-taking action to that point. 
To guard against the effects of another gas attack, they smashed the windows 
and brought in dogs. Against storming by special forces, they rigged the 
explosives with what were effectively hair triggers. They ensured that their 
determination was unmistakable by sacrificing two of the women hostage-takers 
early in the siege. Finally, they asked for specific persons to help with 
negotiations, individuals that they expected to work with them. 
 
The Russian forces at Beslan appear to have kept the previous sieges in mind as 
well. While the tactics special forces used in the 2002 theater siege showed 
innovation, the loss of so many hostages was viewed as extreme and essentially 
precluded the repeated use of gas. Early in the Beslan siege, Putin himself 
declared that special forces would not storm the school, presumably a move to 
give the local population some confidence that government forces themselves 
would not cause unnecessary loss of life. Specific FSB units were employed 
repeatedly in these sieges, probably to exploit any experience gained. In both the 
theater and the school drama, these special forces were reported to be practicing 
a rescue attempt during the stand-off. As the previous events had lasted three to 
five days each, it appears that the government forces in Beslan assumed they 
would have more time to plan for a rescue than the 52 hours between the school 
take-over and the beginning of the firefight. One notable difference in the case of 
the Beslan siege, however, was the intervention of armed locals related to the 
hostages, clearly a complicating factor that had not been well-considered. 
Christian Northern Ossetia is traditionally pro-Russian, so little local sympathy for 
the Chechen cause was to be expected, but neither was the natural anger of 
parents of the hostage children, wishing to kill the captors. 
 
Perhaps the most striking aspect was the apparent lack of coordination among 
government forces. Was Andreyev, the regional security head, actually in charge 
and was he obfuscating details purposely early in the crisis, or was he simply 
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unprepared for the spotlight, making up numbers as he spoke? Did the police 
purposely set up a loose cordon that allowed armed civilians through or was it 
simply sloppy? Were the special forces taken by surprise by the firefight, or did 
they intend to force the hostage-takers’ hands? President Putin has conceded 
the need for investigations, but it is unclear what results will be made public. (12) 
In fact, Putin’s own policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists (13) left few 
options. The local police was unable to prevent a sizable cache of explosives and 
truckloads of hostages taken from entering the school on the first day of classes. 
Was this the result of incompetence, corruption, or both? The special forces, 
assuming they are the most professional and dependable of all Russian military 
entities, seemed singularly inept to handle the situation. Whether they had a 
hand in the start of the firefight or not–the loss of so many of their numbers along 
with the hostages (caught in the cross-fire), must be viewed as a catastrophic 
failure. However, even the most capable western forces might have had 
considerable difficulty responding to a Beslan-style siege. 
 
Fallout 
While Putin’s internal investigation will provide ample justification for any 
punishment he sees fit, it is unlikely any senior administration official will be 
sacked for this, especially as so many of them are long-time associates of the 
president. At best there may be a minor cabinet shuffle. 
 
An easy scapegoat for this catastrophe is the regional security services director, 
Valeri Andreyev. Not only was he egregious in his presentation of misinformation, 
his subordinates failed to prevent the siege in the first place. North Ossetian 
Interior Minister Kazbek Dzantiyev has accepted his failings in the attack and 
handed in his resignation. Aleksandr Dzasokhov, the president of North Ossetia, 




It is unlikely that any personnel moves, however warranted the dismissal may be, 
will preclude the next hostage-taking event, or even the loss of more hostages. 
Real change at the tactical and operational level must include scenario-based 
training involving all elements of the chain of command and all involved 
organizations–FSB, the Interior Ministry, Army and Police forces (especially 
Moscow police)–not to prevent the next crisis, but to bring it to a more effective 
end. A helpful addition to the process would be the inclusion of a dedicated 
negotiations team to work with hostage-takers not to assess their policy demands 
but to help trade time for lives and attempt to free hostages without gunfire, 
Putin’s no-negotiations policy notwithstanding. 
 
Preventing such events, however, is more problematic. Undoubtedly a more 
effective response capability will reduce the perceived value of such events in the 
future, but with hostage-takers placing little value on their own lives, it is likely the 




(1) "As it happened: Russian school siege," BBC News World Edition, 4 Sep 04, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3624136.stm and Yulia Latynina, "Heroism and 
Monstrous Incompetence," Moscow Times, 8 Sep 04, via Johnson’s Russia List, 
8357, 7 Sep 04. 
(2) BBC News World Edition, ibid. and Yulia Kalinina, "The Impotent Ones," 
Moskovskii komsomolets, 10 Sep 04 via CDI Russia Weekly, 10 Sep 04. 
(3) "Force ruled out in Russian siege," BBC News UK Edition, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3620498.stm). 
(4) "Military Officials Cited on Measures Following Beslan School Seizure," 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 Sep 04 p. 3; FBIS-SOV.2004.0902 via World News 
Connection. 
(5) "As it happened: Russian school siege," BBC News World Edition, Ibid. 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
With attention focused on terrorist attacks within its national borders, the Russian 
government has released proposed government spending figures for 2005. 
Despite the distractions, the Russian and foreign media quickly noted the 28% 
increase in funding for the armed forces. Russians, who in the past may have 
looked to their vaunted military to provide security against the perceived threat 
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presented by NATO and the West, probably took little comfort in the 
announcement of significant funding increases for the military sector. Some 
accused the government of turning decidedly militarist and others wondered, 
"what if the Ground Forces and their funding are increasing not only to fight 
terrorists and gunmen?" (1) While significant issues cloud straight-line evaluation 
of the budget news, closer analysis of the officially released numbers and 
administration commentary can provide insight into military planning and 
government data. 
 
The Moscow-based military analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, explains that the budget 
announcement presents a highly suspect set of numbers for three reasons: 1) 
the increase scarcely compensates for the years of neglect of the armed forces 
(a position highlighted by former Chief of the General Staff, General Anatoli 
Kvashnin during budget discussions back in June 2004) (2); 2) the numbers do 
not take inflation into account. Inflation in Russia has been very high, and, 
according to Felgenhauer, "they say that next year, they’ll be able to lower it to 
below 10 percent annuallyso in reality, the increase in defense spending is 
around 15 percent;" 3) and perhaps most importantly, the lack of transparency 
with regard to Russian expenditures renders impossible verifying budget or 
spending statistics (3) The Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov, in fact 
provided an example when he went to great lengths to explain that the 2005 
budget "will enable us to accomplish the key strategic task of spending 60 
percent of the total amount on the upkeep of the armed forces and 40 percent on 
their development (acquisition and training)." This, according to Ivanov, shifts the 
balance from the 70/30 balance that existed back in 2001, and is in line with a 
recommendation made by the Security Council at a meeting in 2000. (4) 
However, none of the numbers released by the government allow anyone to 
verify this percentage. In fact, if one takes the amount allocated to the 
maintenance of the armed forces (R383 billion) and divides it by the published 
total defense expenditure (R528 billion), the result is about 72.5%. With no ability 
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to drill any deeper into the numbers, one can only take Minister Ivanov at his 
word. 
 
Despite the problems noted above, some valuable points may be gleaned from 
the budget numbers and statements by government officials regarding the 
defense budget. Sergei Ivanov took several occasions to speak about his work 
with the finance and economic development ministers to allocate an additional 
R30 billion for defense above the original budgeted amount, making it clear that 
this additional sum would be spent on the purchase of armaments. (5) According 
to Ivanov, substantial sums have been spent on research in the last several 
years, but, the time has come to start buying weapons for the army and navy. (6) 
 
In addition to acquisition spending proposed by the new budget, an additional 
R3.5 billion will be poured into defense industries in the context of "mobilization 
preparation of the national economy;" This section receives one of the largest 
percentage increases of the proposed budget. In 2002, approximately 2,300 
enterprises competed for R.5 billion; In 2005, the 1,300 defense companies that 
remain will compete for R3.5 billion. (7) This 700% increase in budget allocation, 
combined with the stated increase in acquisitions budget, highlights the 
government's recognition that the defense industry requires a serious injection of 
investment. 
 
After years of reliance on foreign military sales with virtually no acquisition by the 
Russian military, the defense industry now needs the government to rectify the 
imbalance. The investment in acquisition, while probably useful in mollifying 
some powerful generals (and perhaps representing barter deals for support), 
may make an even more important contribution in maintaining a steady stream of 
revenue from sales of military hardware to foreign countries. Sergei Ivanov has 
alluded several times to the plans for a considerable number of research and 
design projects to be completed next year and ready for adoption into service. (8) 
It is time for research and development to pay off in production of new weapons. 
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Russia may stand to gain by this investment, not necessarily because it will make 
the Russian military more capable, but because it will improve its position in the 
international arms marketplace. One example is the new MI-28N Havoc 
helicopter, a much-awaited product that will enjoy a stronger niche in the 
international arms markets, if the Russian military adopts it. "Foreign customers’ 
decision to buy aircraft depends greatly on whether the aircraft is adopted for 
service in the manufacturing country" claims Rostvertol Company Director, 
General Boris Slyusar. "The MI-28N’s fielding in Russia will make the aircraft 
more competitive in the international market." (9) So government spending on 
acquisition in 2005 is tied undoubtedly to the "ready for production" results of 
years of research investment. The Russian military will not be able to afford large 
numbers of these weapons, but its purchase of any of these systems will mean 
real income for the Russian defense industry from foreign buyers. 
 
A more disappointing inference that might be derived from the budget discourse 
is that military reforms have failed and there is no effort to revive them, especially 
the much-discussed professional "contract" force revamp. Despite Sergei 
Ivanov’s recent assertion that military reforms have been successfully 
accomplished, it is generally accepted even by those with a role in government, 
that the reforms have scarcely started and have had little impact. Viktor 
Yasmann, in an article for RFE/RL, cites a recent Russian Security Council’s 
report as having argued "that the lack of real military reform — combined with 
corruption and mismanagement — have led to the accelerating deterioration of 
the material status of the military." The report further claims that "the state is no 
longer in a position to maintain and control the armed forces. Therefore it closes 
its eyes to corruption and plunder." (10) In addition to these problems, the military 
has huge recruiting and retention problems with regard to its contract 
servicemen. The Army reports that it will likely meet its 2004 recruiting goal of 
15,700 contract soldiers, although the recruits are, on the whole, once again 
considered to be qualitatively deficient for the creation of a truly professional 
force. (11) Most experts consider the 2005 recruiting goal of 54,500 simply out of 
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reach. (12) The primary issues cited by those opting not to sign a contract, or by 
those who resigned from contracted units, are pay and housing. (13) Despite the 
claims of the Russian Finance Minister, Aleksei Kudrin, that the plan to transfer 
to contract service "is fully funded, and as from 2008 the country will be able to 
[afford] a one-year conscription service," the 2005 budget showed no marked 
increase in prospective pay for contract soldiers that would allow the military to 
overcome problems with the program. (14) Even Defense Minister Ivanov 
highlighted a R3 billion deficit in funds required for housing, noting that this 
problem wouldn’t be solved until at least 2015. (15) 
 
Analyzing Russian defense spending is problematic, but nothing in the budget 
numbers or surrounding rhetoric should comfort Russian citizens that the armed 
forces will mend themselves quickly with this increase in funding. The defense 
industry looks like the winner. Even if the Russian military buys little new 
hardware, the adoption of new weapon systems will mean a boon in military 
sales for the defense industries. The program to transition the armed forces to a 
contract, professional force appears to be on life support, being kept alive more 
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EXTERNAL 
Russian reaction to President Bush's proposed troop realignment plan 
President Bush announced a long anticipated plan to realign U.S. military forces 
stationed abroad. The plan, outlined in a speech in Ohio on August 16, 
encompasses the return of two Army divisions from bases in Germany and 
changes to force levels in other Cold War era locations. The plan calls for 
increasing the U.S. presence at bases in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and 
possibly Africa. 
 
The realignment could close some U.S. military installations in Europe and help 
fulfill Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 requirements. At the same 
time, the United States would make greater use of training and logistics bases on 
the soil of its new Eastern European allies, where overall costs are lower and 
environmental concerns and requirements less stringent than Western European 
ranges. 
 
The moves are meant to give the U.S. military increased combat power and more 
flexibility in dealing with the smaller military engagements that are likely to 
characterize the continued prosecution of the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism 
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(GWOT). President Bush pointed out the intention of the reorganization: "The 
new plan will help us fight and win these wars of the 21st century." (1) 
 
Initial Russian reaction to the proposed U.S. troop realignment was rather muted. 
The proposed troop movement has been discussed openly since the end of the 
Cold War (and NATO's first eastern expansion), and therefore is not a startling 
initiative. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made a point to inform Russian 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov about the plan during their meeting in St. 
Petersburg, prior to President Bush's speech. The Russian Defense Minister told 
journalists, "We know about the United States' plans to reconfigure its forces, 
and we understand him." (2) He added, "I see nothing alarming in these plans." 
(3) It may be difficult for "great power" nationalists to grasp, but Russia has little 
choice but to accept U.S. realignment. Additionally, Russia understands the logic 
behind the plan. A force of highly mobile, combat-ready troops, based near areas 
of instability has been on Moscow’s military transformation wish list for several 
years. 
 
The wave of recent terror attacks in Russia quickly overshadowed the U.S. troop 
realignment and will have a much greater near term influence on Russian military 
policy. Due to the numbers of attacks and deaths, especially in Beslan, President 
Putin is under public pressure to produce immediate results, but the decision as 
to an appropriate response, as well as to Russian participation in GWOT will 
have a huge impact on long term Russian military policy toward the United States 
and NATO. 
 
Putin’s NATO-Russia Council option 
Putin, using the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as the vehicle, could increase 
Russia’s involvement in the GWOT and increase military cooperation with U.S. 
and NATO troops. He took an encouraging step toward strengthening the NRC 
relationship by requesting an emergency meeting of the NRC after the Beslan 
school crisis; this marked the first such request by Russia after a terrorist 
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incident. During the meeting, the NRC discussed ways of expanding joint 
measures in the fight against terrorism. The council also issued a statement 
condemning "the outrageous terrorist attacks perpetrated against the people of 
the Russian Federation." (4) Both NATO and Russia agreed to strengthen and 
intensify their common antiterrorism efforts, including the creation of a specific 
action plan. 
 
The meeting was a first step, but if Russia truly wants to be a primary player 
within the American-led GWOT and expand its partnership with NATO, more 
must be done. The U.S. would look for Russia to sacrifice some of its traditional, 
long held influence in Central Asia, and instead characterize the U.S. troop 
relocation as a stabilizing move against international terrorism rather than a 
Russian failure to protect its own borders. More robust Russian participation in 
the NATO-Russian Council, especially along the lines of direct military and 
intelligence cooperation could also promote an antiterrorism partnership. Russia 
should exploit joint basing opportunities within the Central Asian region; a joint 
terrorism response base between the U.S. Ganci Air Base and the Russian Kant 
Air Base in Kyrgyzstan would be a logical place to start. 
 
Putin’s traditional (Cold War) option 
Putin’s other option is to counter the U.S. Troop realignment and not to 
participate in the GWOT. Putin could easily spin the realignment as further 
erosion of Russian world standing and continue to point to American and 
Western European sympathy for and contact with "moderate" Chechen 
separatists. Russia could even try to undermine or counterbalance U.S. influence 
by increasing Russian troops in Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Tajikistan. The 
increased Russian military presence would suggest a more active and 
aggressive role in all the former Soviet Republics in the name of 
counterterrorism. If Putin chooses not to embrace the troop realignment, Russia 
could look to establish counter-terrorist alliances outside of the NRC. Russia 
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could even strengthen its ties with countries on the U.S. State Department's list 
of sponsors of state terrorism, such as Iran. 
 
Conclusion 
President Putin is most likely to choose a path between the two extremes. The 
NATO option, as previously discussed, will not give Putin a quick victory nor will it 
provide the show of strength needed after the Beslan school tragedy. It is likely 
that all the discussions with NATO and references to the GWOT are designed to 
cultivate Western goodwill and are not likely to produce any radical change in 
Russia's current policy. President Putin is likely to adopt a harder stance on 
Chechnya and consolidate even more power in the Security Services. In 
Moscow, on 8 September, Chief of the General Staff, General Yuri Baluyevsky, 
met with NATO's Supreme Allied Commander U.S. General James Jones, where 
he claimed that "Russia is prepared, if necessary, to conduct preemptive strikes 
against terrorist bases anywhere in the world." (5) Based on this assertion, it is 
likely that President Putin and the Russian military will take a much more 
aggressive and direct role in the affairs of former Soviet Republics. President 
Putin seems intent on taking unilateral action against perceived threats and 
justifying his actions with President Bush’s preemptive policy on terrorism and 
NATO policy in Yugoslavia as models. 
 
President Putin’s primary aims are not increasing Russia’s role in the GWOT, 
Russian, U.S. and NATO interaction, or even decreasing U.S. influence in 
Central Asia, his central focus is the aggressive prosecution of the Chechen war 
and, more broadly, the confrontation with terrorism throughout Russia and the 
former Soviet Republics. His level of NRC or GWOT participation appears 
intended primarily to limit U.S. and NATO opposition to and criticism of his 
activities. 
 
In the end, President Putin may welcome the U.S. presence in Central Asia and 
possibly other locations. U.S. influence and stabilization could slow or block 
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some avenues of international terrorist support for radical Chechen elements. He 
will not however, welcome any international assistance or interference in his 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
BELARUS 
Lukashenko proposes a referendum to stay in power 
On 7 September, Lukashenko overstepped the boundaries of the constitution 
that he himself had set and announced a referendum, which would allow him to 
run for a third term, or for an indefinite number of terms, for that matter. The 
referendum question will be phrased as follows: Will you allow the first President 
of Belarus, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, to participate as a presidential candidate in 
the 2006 presidential elections, and will you accept the following version of 
Article 81, Part 1 of the constitution: "The president is elected for a five-year term 
by a direct, universal, free and secret ballot?" (1) 
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Significantly, Lukashenko made the announcement just a few days after the 
hostage tragedy in Beslan — when the attention of the Russian leader, and most 
of the world, was focused on the consequences of the hostage drama. The 
Chairman of the Central Election Committee of Belarus, Lydia Ermoshina, 
claimed that the announcement had been planned in advance for 6-7 September, 
and the fact that it coincided with the post-Beslan mourning period in Russia was 
pure coincidence. "It was impossible to move the announcement to several days 
[earlier], as it was necessary to create territorial election committees." (2) In any 
event, Lukashenko did not hesitate to use post-Beslan emotions and compassion 
in his favor. During the time of the Moscow antiterrorist rally, the Belarus 
authorities decided to support the Russians by holding a similar rally in the center 
of Minsk. However, soon after the gathering in the square began, the militia 
informed the public that the rally was being moved to 9 p.m. — the time of the 
president’s statement about the upcoming referendum. Just to ensure that the 
crowd did not miss the presidential declaration, a huge screen with speakers was 
installed in the square. 
 
As a justification for asking to remove the limit on the number of terms he may 
serve, Lukashenko talked about his successes, such as elimination of pension 
arrears, increases in average salary, support of rural communities, increased 
construction, etc. He also attacked his opponents for planning to destroy 
Belarusia's "clear lakes and forests, and unpilfered economy," should they come 
to power, and named as his primary goal the protection of Belarus from those 
who threatened Belarus’ "peaceful and creative way of life." (3) 
 
Effect on the opposition 
The referendum to allow Lukashenko to run for a third term will take place on 17 
October — the same day as the parliamentary elections. Speaking of which, the 
president’s announcement of his intention to run for a third term is likely to 
increase the opposition's chances to win seats in the parliamentary elections — a 
windfall for a weak Belarusian opposition. Thus, instead of trying to convince 
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Belarusian voters of the relevance of each party’s political vision, the opposition 
groups simply will have to stress that they are against changing the constitution 
and against allowing Lukashenko to run for a third term. This slogan will give the 
opposition a chance to speak with one voice and, given that more than half of all 
Belarusians do not support Lukashenko’s bid to stay in power, is likely to mean 
gains for to the opposition parties. "In this situation, the referendum itself and not 
the [parliamentary] candidates will be our main rival," said Anatoliy Lebed’ko, the 
Chairman of the United Civil Party. (4) 
 
During the months leading to the parliamentary elections, the opposition had 
been largely marginalized. Until lately, the authorities excluded opposition 
representatives from the polling station commissions. The main opposition 
organization, the Five-Plus Popular Coalition Initiative, is not even a registered 
organization and those carrying out activities on its behalf can be arrested and 
imprisoned. A member of the Coordinating Committee Free Belarus, Dzmitryy 
Baradka, who is also a candidate in the upcoming parliamentary elections, was 
not allowed to travel abroad. A head of the Barysaw passport and visa service 
was instructed by the KGB to "hold off" issuing him an exit visa (a remnant of the 
Soviet past). (5) 
 
It can be hoped only that Belarusians have enough courage and perseverance 
not to allow the last dictator of Europe to stay in power. For this to happen, the 
Belarusians will have to give voice to their indignation and demand a fair election. 
First steps are being taken already. The morning of 13 September was marked 
by an internet action of protest against Lukashenko ruling Belarus forever — "Tell 




(Almost) All against one. 
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Twenty-six candidates are registered to run for president on 31 October — a 
number, which, when compared to one predetermined communist party 
candidate during pre-independence times, might seem a sign of progress toward 
democracy. It is, of course, anything but. The majority of candidates will simply 
aid the current prime minister, Yanukovich, gain the presidency. Many 
presidential contenders are only minor regional players on the Ukrainian political 
scene and, as a rule, do not head significant party structures (e.g., Rzhavskiy, 
Nechiporuk, Boiko). According to the recent poll in Ukraine, voters do not know 
anything about 13 of the 26 candidates (the poll was conducted among 2000 
persons in 111 residential areas). (6) 
 
There are several factors in play when it comes to benefiting from such decoy 
candidates. The first, is the number of representatives on the election 
committees. Analysts say that Yanukovich already outnumbers Yushchenko in 
terms of "his" representatives by five to one. (7) Needless to say, election 
monitoring and preventing election fraud will be five times as hard for 
Yushchenko’s representatives. Second, "pro-Yanukovich" candidates, given their 
combined air time, which they use mostly to attack Yushchenko, can jeopardize 
substantially Yushchenko’s chances to win this election. This amount of negative 
information coming from such a large number of presidential candidates is bound 
to have an impact on the population's psyche, especially given Yushchenko’s 
limited air time to disprove the allegations. Dmytro Kochynskyy (the 
ultranationalist Bratstvo organization leader) does not even hide his (government 
supported) goal of the pre-election campaign — to impede Yushchenko in his 
attempts to become the president. (8) 
 
Such an election strategy by the authorities, combined with non-transparent pre-
elections practices, is already producing the desired results. The Ukrainian on-
line periodical, Zerkalo nedeli, recently published the results of the distribution of 
the 675 leading posts on the territorial election committees. The assignments 
were determined by a computer (that no one ever saw) and the opposition 
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leaders were definitely out of luck. Neither Yushchenko nor Moroz got a single 
representative in any of the nine okrugs of Zaporozhskaya oblast’, and were 
likewise shut out of Sumskaya and Nikolaevskaya oblast’ — regions where the 
most fierce and intense battle is projected to take place. But the computer 
generously allocated them more than enough representatives in the regions 
where the opposition has strong popular support (e.g. Poltavskaya oblast’) 
anyway. (9) In other regions, where Yushchenko’s supporters have not even filed 
for a quota of the leading posts on the election (as their influence is strong 
enough without the positions), they received 14! Both Yushchenko and Moroz 
are indignant that they have not even seen the mysterious computer, which 
managed to further jeopardize their chances for victory. (10) They probably never 
will, have the opportunity since the rest of the candidates are, naturally, content 
with the distribution results. 
 
Controversial Danube canal 
On 26 August, Kuchma held a ceremony to open a Danube-Black Sea shipping 
canal. Before the opening of the canal, Ukrainian ships were compelled to pay a 
fee to Romania for the use of the passage to the Black Sea. The new canal, 
which will enable the passage of 1000 ships a year, may bring $50 million yearly 
profit to Ukraine. (11) The construction of the canal evoked harsh reactions from 
the E.U, the U.S. and Romania, which previously had a monopoly on navigation 
in the Danube delta. At present, the area in which the canal was built is protected 
by UNESCO and an international convention for protection of marshlands. (12) 
Protesters claim the canal will endanger 3,500 unique species, while Kuchma is 
claiming that all environmental norms were observed in constructing the canal. 
Romania is submitting a lawsuit to the International Court of Justice. while 
President Kuchma is saying that Romania is driven solely by the economic 
reasons. 
 
Explosions in Ukraine 
 27
Two explosions took place in Ukraine on 20 and 30 August. The first one was a 
market blast in Kiev, which killed one woman. The second one took place in 
Ivano-Frankivsk, near the building that houses the election headquarters of 
presidential candidate and New Force party leader, Yuriy Zbitnyev. (13) The 
police claim that the explosions were intended to destabilize the country before 
the upcoming presidential elections. Roman Bezsmertnyy, the head of 
Yushchenko’s central election headquarters, declared that Yushchenko’s 
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By Ariela Shapiro 
 
The Beslan hostage crisis of 1-3 Sep demonstrates the total failure of Putin’s 
Chechen policy to resolve effectively the Chechen conflict and prevent its 
expansion into North Ossetia, Dagestan and Ingushetia. In addition, the Beslan 
tragedy marks an escalation in Russia’s civil war. The terrorists who seized 
School No. 1 used new tactics by targeting children, withholding food and drink 
from the hostages and firing into their backs when they tried to escape. These 
methods stand in stark contrast to those of the June raid in Ingushetia, in which 
guerillas tried to avoid targeting civilians of any age. On the Russian side, the 
authorities suppressed information and spread misinformation about the number 
of hostages, the ethnic identities of the hostage-takers, the number of casualties 
among both the hostage-takers and the hostages, and the fate of the hostage-
takers that escaped the assault on the school. The Russian authorities even 
used ridiculous methods to prevent two of Moscow’s most outspoken and 
respected journalists, Anna Politkovskaya of Novaya gazeta and Andrei Babitsky 
of Radio Liberty, from reaching Beslan. Politkovskaya was poisoned under 
suspicious circumstances while on her way to cover the hostage crisis in Beslan; 
Babitsky was apprehended at Moscow's Vnukovo airport and charged with 
"minor hooliganism" and given a 5-day jail sentence. The Russian misinformation 
scheme stems from a realization that its total military and political incompetence 
during the Beslan crisis is partially responsible for the horrific body count of the 
terrorist attack. An account of the Beslan hostage crisis follows, but many 
questions remain unanswered as to the true behavior and intentions of the 
hostage-takers and the Russian authorities.  
 
On Wednesday, 1 September, as parents, teachers and students were gathering 
for first-day of school festivities at School Number 1 in Beslan, they were 
interrupted by a group of militants. These militants drove into the school 
courtyard, surrounded the children and adults and divided the hostages into two 
groups. The children, with a few teachers, were taken into the gymnasium on the 
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ground floor of the school, while most of the adults were placed in second floor 
classrooms. According to interviews with ex-hostages, the hostage-takers initially 
gave food and drink to their captives. (1) As news of the attack spread, parents 
and relatives gathered outside the school buildings and police reinforcements 
arrived. At 11:30 a.m., North Ossetia's President Aleksandr Dzasokhov arrived at 
Beslan while Putin returned to Moscow, cutting short his vacation in Sochi. Soon 
after Dzasokhov arrived, the hostage takers requested talks with former Ingush 
President Ruslan Aushev, current Ingush President Murat Zyazikov, well-known 
pediatrician Leonid Roshal and Russian presidential aide on Chechnya 
Aslambek Aslakhanov. In addition, the hostage-takers announced their first 
demand: the release of detainees involved in the June raid in Ingushetia. (2) 
Towards the late afternoon, Russian Federal Forces arrived and an FSB 
spokesman informed journalists that the terrorists had seized about 300 persons. 
(3) In fact, it later would become evident that the militants held about 1,200 
hostages. At this point, government officials knew that they were lying to 
journalists as the school had more than 800 registered pupils for the scholastic 
year. However, it was only on 4 September that North Ossetian presidential aide 
Lev Dzugayev admitted for the first time that the number of hostages in the 
school exceeded 1,000. (4)  
 
According to testimonies of former hostages, the militants spent the next couple 
of hours laying down mines and booby traps throughout the gymnasium building. 
(5) It is still unclear how the terrorists brought their weapons into the school. 
Russian Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov claimed, in his report to President 
Vladimir Putin, that the hostage takers brought their arsenal with them. However, 
former hostages recognized a few of the terrorists and added that during the 
crisis, the militants were retrieving hidden weapons and explosives planted 
throughout the school. According to an Agence France-Presse report, the 
hostage-takers first scouted out two others schools before settling on School #1, 
as it was undergoing major renovation over the summer, including the 
construction of a new gym floor. The militants then disguised themselves as 
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workers and brought in bombs, rocket launchers and other weapons, stashing 
these munitions in a case in the basement under the new gym floor. (6)  
On 1 September, shortly after 1:00 p.m., the hostage takers dropped a note from 
one of the windows outlining their main demand: the withdrawal of Russian 
forces from Chechnya. (7) Initially, the demand was widely reported by Russian 
news agencies, but it quickly disappeared from reports and was not reiterated 
until the afternoon of 2 September. The hostage-takers also threatened to blow 
up the building if it was stormed and that for every militant killed, 50 hostages 
would die. (8)  
 
During the afternoon of 1 September, Akhmed Zakaev, the London-based 
spokesman for Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov, made rejected 
Kremlin claims of Maskhadov's involvement in the Beslan crisis. In an interview 
with Radio Free Europe, Zakaev denied not only Maskhadov’s involvement in the 
crisis, and denounced the terrorist attack as "horrific and unnatural," but also 
contradicted Russian statements that there were Arab and African mercenaries 
among the terrorists. (9)  
 
Shortly before nightfall, Doctor Roshal arrived in Beslan and began holding talks 
with the hostage-takers. The talks lasted throughout the night in the Emergency 
Ministry Headquarters set up in the immediate vicinity of the school. At noon on 2 
September, Lev Dzugaev stated that "technical talks" with the hostage-takers 
were continuing, and that the militants were close to accepting food, water and 
medicine. However, at this point the hostage-takers’ main demand of Russian 
troop withdrawal from Chechnya remained relatively unpublicized, and Russian 
news sources continued to report that only (approximately) 350 hostages were 
being held. At this point, and perhaps in reaction to Russian misinformation, the 
behavior of the hostage-takers changed precipitously. According to interviews 
with ex-hostages, on the afternoon of 2 September, when the food and water in 
the school ran out, the hostage-takers refused offers of food and medicine from 
Dr. Roshal. In an interview with Novaya gazeta, two teachers relayed that they 
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overheard the terrorists boasting that they would kill as many hostages as was 
needed to meet the figures cited by Russian authorities. (10) In other words, of 
the 1,200 hostages, the terrorists would shoot 850 so that only 350 remained.  
 
During Dr. Roshal’s visit to the school, the FSB announced that resolution of the 
standoff excluded any use of force. (11) Later that afternoon, Russian Interior 
Minister Rashid Nurgaliev and FSB Head Nikolai Patrushev arrived in Beslan to 
coordinate military operations and to establish a crisis team. After Dr. Roshal’s 
failure to mediate with the militants, Ruslan Aushev, the former president of 
Ingushetia, entered the school to negotiate. Aushev's efforts resulted in the 
release of twenty-six hostages. (12) At around 8:00 p.m., Dzasokhov and Aushev 
telephoned Zakaev in London and requested that Maskhadov use his influence 
to end the hostage crisis. (13) This conversation was not publicized until 6 
September, by which time the Russian government had decided not to pursue 
the Maskhadov option. However, it is unlikely that such a high-level contact was 
established without Putin’s direct knowledge and authorization. Maskhadov’s 
immediate response was a statement on the chechenpress.org website harshly 
condemning the hostage-takers, a political move that the Russian authorities 
chose to ignore. (14)  
 
Overnight September 2-3, three Russian tanks arrived outside the school. Soon 
afterwards, shots were fired from the school which wounded a police officer in 
the near vicinity. On the morning of 3 September, Dzasokhov and Aushev again 
telephoned Zakaev and he relayed Maskhadov’s willingness to do anything in his 
power to aid in the resolution of the crisis. (15)  
 
Shortly before noon, President Dzasokhov held a meeting with relatives of the 
hostages at a Beslan cultural center. He informed the Beslan citizens that there 
were actually over 500 hostages held in the school (a fact they must have known 
by that time), while reiterating the hostage takers' main demand of the withdrawal 
of Russian forces from Chechnya. During the council meeting, Dzasokhov’s 
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spokesman publicly announced that the hostage-takers had agreed to hand over 
the bodies of several persons killed during the standoff, while adding that the 
militants had presented a new demand: total Chechen independence. (16) 
 
Although the Emergency Situation Ministry seemingly ignored the new terrorist 
demand, it reacted quickly to the opportunity to gain access to the school 
building. In order to take the bodies away, the Emergency Situation Ministry sent 
a car, containing several emergency personnel, to the school. According to the 
official version of events, two explosions went off inside the school, which 
demolished one of the outside walls of the gymnasium. (17) As group of 
hostages began to flee through the ruined wall, the hostage-takers started 
shooting at the emergency personnel, the hostages and the crowd waiting 
outside the school. Once the hostage-takers began firing, the Russian forces 
stormed the building and, within minutes, four Russian combat helicopters joined 
the battle. (18) At some point during the firefight, the roof of the gymnasium 
collapsed, trapping hostages, Russian federal forces and hostage-takers inside. 
Outside the school, mayhem erupted as groups of hostages, adults and children 
alike, poured forth, with gunfire from all sides. 
 
Contradictory reports however, have emerged from former hostages and 
eyewitness accounts. An emergency staffer who drove up to the school in the 
minutes before the siege was broken, reported that there were no initial 
explosions. The emergency worker claims someone opened fire from outside the 
school, at which point the militants fired back. The explosions soon followed. 
Other witnesses suggest that the initial gunfire might have come from among the 
crowd of parents and relatives waiting outside the school. Some say the 
explosions were actually Russian tank fire, which blew off part of the school's 
roof. (19) 
 
Moscow-based military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer also doubts the Kremlin's 
version of an unplanned, last-minute decision to storm the school, saying the 
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appearance of attack helicopters points to a coordinated, pre-planned move. 
Felgenhauer adds that although there is an air base near Beslan, the helicopters 
could not have made it to the school in less than half an hour. (20) 
By 3:00 p.m., the Russian military forces claimed control of most of the school, 
but the shooting did not subside until late into the night. Indeed, despite a public 
statement by the North Ossetian Interior Ministry that none of the hostages were 
left in the gymnasium by 4:00 p.m., both the BBC and CNN reported that people 
were escaping the building at 5:00 p.m. (21) According to Interfax, militants were 
still holding hostage children captive until 8:00 p.m. (22) As the firefight tapered 
off, the terrorists split into three groups and tried to leave the city. The first group, 
of about 5 people, remained in the school and exchanged fire with the Special 
Forces while the second group tried to break through to the southern suburb of 
the city toward the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz. The third group, who 
changed their clothes, mixed in with local residents. (23) As of 4 September, 32 
bodies of militants had been recovered in the Beslan school building and Special 
Forces were still searching for 4 other terrorists. (24) 
 
After the hostage-takers had been neutralized, the hostages were taken to 
mobile hospitals and the three Beslan hospitals; the worst cases were sent out to 
Moscow and Vladikavkaz. On 5 September, the Russian authorities reported the 
official number of deaths to be 394, with 210 taken from the debris and 120 as 
yet unidentified. The total number hospitalized was 704 people, with 173 
discharged and a remaining 531 people receiving medical care. (25) 
 
At present, the identity of the terrorists is one of the most contentious elements of 
the hostage crisis. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the Russian 
authorities claimed that the militants included 10 Arabs and 1 African. (26) 
However, as of 9 September, the authorities had yet to produce any evidence for 
the claim that such a large number of hostage-takers were from outside the 
Russian Federation. On 4 September, Novaya gazeta reported that ex-hostages 
had told representatives of the Memorial human rights group that the terrorists 
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included Ingush, Chechens, Ossetians and Russians. (27) The Novaya gazeta 
report was validated by two independent stories published on September 9 by 
The St. Petersburg Times and the BBC that identified ten of the terrorists 
involved in the Beslan hostage crisis. Of the ten, six were of Chechen descent, 
with two being born in Kazakhstan, while two were Ingush and two were 
Ossetian. (28) In a dubious statement given on 4 September, the so-called 
Islamic brigade of "Riyadus Salikh’iyn", a shadowy militant group established 
three years ago by Basaev, assumed responsibility for the Beslan tragedy. 
However, Basaev's quick denial of involvement in the hostage crisis casts doubt 
on the Salikh’iyn participation in the attack. (29) Although ten hostage-takers 
have been recognized, there is no information available about the identities of the 
other 26 militants or their organizational affiliations. Indeed, the Russian 
authorities guaranteed this information gap by annihilating rather then 
apprehending the militants during and after the firefight. 
 
The inept and dubious behavior of the Russian political establishment during and 
in the immediate aftermath of the Beslan crisis indicates that it does not take the 
terrorists seriously. Rather, both Putin’s public denial of any link between Beslan 
and Chechnya and his current initiative to launch preemptive strikes on terror 
camps anywhere they threaten Russia foretell a further escalation of the 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Kazakh elections 
On 19 September, Kazakhstan will hold its second parliamentary elections for the 
Majlis (lower house), since obtaining independence in 1991. The previous round 
of elections, held in October 1999, resulted in a substantial boost for President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev's Otan party, as well as several other pro-Presidential 
parties. But the election was marred by what international organizations, 
including the OSCE, described as "widespread, universal and illegal meddling 
with the election process by the executive branch." (1) 
 
During the spring and summer months of this year, President Nazarbaev 
instituted changes to the electoral system, which he hoped would present an 
image to observers and the outside world of a free and fair vote. First, Nazarbaev 
announced in March that a significant number of electoral districts would vote 
electronically (using the Saylau Voting System). In his address to Parliament on 
1 September, Nazarbaev argued that the new system would allow an election to 
take place "in line with international standards." (2) 
 
It is no surprise that approval for the Saylau Voting Computers, and the 
electronic vote, has also come from the CIS: Speaking to the Kazakh press at the 
end of a two-day visit to Kazakhstan, CIS Executive Council Chairman Vladimir 
Rushailo stated that he was convinced that the system would return an 
"impartial" result. (3) On the same day, the Kazakh Central Election Commission 
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announced that the system had passed its final tests, and proven itself 
"technically reliable" in time for the 19 September polls. (4) 
 
Secondly, Kazakhstan held its first formal, televised debates in which all twelve 
registered parties participated. The five debates which have taken place so far, 
occurred between 20 August and 3 September. (5) The format for the 
discussions involved opening and closing statements, as well as question and 
answer periods for each party. Reports on the debates indicate that there was 
some direct criticism of President Nazarbaev, specifically by Serikbolsyn 
Abdildin, leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. (6) 
 
It is evident that President Nazarbaev hopes that the "transparency" of the 
political process, as shown by the debates, coupled with electronic voting, will 
lend these elections an air of legitimacy. But events which began occurring over 
the summer and which are continue even now, indicate that this election will be 
no less corrupt or unfair than the last. 
 
In July, Nazarbaev made a political move that can be viewed as a deliberate 
attempt to suborn one of the country’s three opposition parties, Ak Zhol. On 12 
July, Nazarbaev appointed Altynbek Sarsenbayev, a co-chairman of Ak Zhol, to 
the post of Information Minister. (7) In an interview with Vremya on 15 July, 
Sarsenbayev stated that he had accepted the post only after receiving an 
assurance from Nazarbaev that the election would take place in an "open and 
honest" fashion. (8) Twelve days after Sarsenbayev was brought into 
Nazarbayev's government, Ak Zhol’s second co-chairman, Bolat Abilov, was 
convicted of slander, after a relatively short trial. 
 
Abilov was tried because a Deputy, Mukhtar Tinikeev, whom he had accused of 
bribing election officials, decided to press charges. Abilov received an 18-month 
suspended sentence on the slander charge. Under the terms of Kazakh law, he 
is banned from participating in next week’s elections. (9) In a statement that must 
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be viewed with some skepticism, Tinikeev has denied strenuously any political 
motivation behind his decision to press charges. What is clear, is that these two 
events (as Nurbolat Masanov, a prominent Nazarbaev opponent, has stated), 
amount to an attempt to "divide and conquer," or neutralize the opposition. (10) 
 
These same parties have made clear their opposition to the use of computers in 
the polls. They have been openly critical, maintaining that the system is open to 
abuse, and could be subject to "manipulations." (11) This opinion is shared by 
Robert Barry, the OSCE’s Head of Mission in Kazakhstan, who has voiced 
publicly his misgivings ahead of the elections. (12) 
 
It is possible that the situation concerning the voting machines could become 
more serious. Both the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and Democratic Choice 
of Kazakhstan announced on 31 August that they might boycott the election. 
Asylbek Kozakhmetov, co-chairman of the coordinating council between the two 
parties, stated that Nazarbaev must limit electronic voting to 2-3% of the 
population rather than the planned 10%. (13) Kozakhmetov had gone as far as 
registering a lawsuit with the Kazakh Supreme Court, which has been dismissed, 
in which he argued that the possibility of "equal elections" would be damaged if 
the electorate was divided between paper and electronic ballots. (14) The issue 
of electronic voting was not the only one raised by Kozakhmetov: he also 
demanded that President Nazarbaev release Galymzhan Zhkiyanov, the leader 
of Democratic Choice for Kazakhstan, who has been imprisoned since 2002. 
Zhkiyanov was convicted of ‘abuse of power’ in what was widely seen at the time 
as a politically motivated case designed to remove a serious opponent of the 
President. (15) In light of the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Kozakhmetov’s case, 
it will be interesting to see whether the Communist and Democratic Choice 
Parties follow through on their threats and actually boycott the elections. Such an 
action would mean that no opposition parties are running in the elections, leaving 
President Nazarbaev with an embarrassing legitimacy question. 
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But it must be asked also whether President Nazarbaev is attempting simply to 
ensure a comprehensive victory for himself and his supporters, or does he have 
a deeper motivation for his actions? 
 
In October 2003, a new political party, called Asar (All Together) was formed. 
The party's chairman is Dariga Nazarbaeva, President Nazarbayev's oldest 
daughter, who also heads Kazakhstan’s largest media company, Khabar. It has 
long been rumored that Nazarbaeva’s brother-in-law, Timur Kubilayev has been 
"vying" with her for influence. (16) During the past week, Nazarbaeva has spoken 
on television about the forthcoming elections. She was highly critical of her 
father's Otan Party, although she avoided personally attacking Nazarbaev. 
According to Nazarbaeva, Otan has resorted to "bullying" tactics in the 
forthcoming elections, despite the fact that "90 per cent" of the Kazakh people 
are "ready to vote for the incumbent president of the country." (17) Nazarbaeva 
also spoke out about voting practices in the country, urging that the electorate 
should be educated on its rights and duties, including the fact that "secrecy of the 
ballot is guaranteed by the constitution, and that there are no technical or other 
administrative methods to find out who voted and how." (18) 
 
Despite Timur Kibulayev’s presence in the succession battle, it has also been 
suspected for some time that President Nazarbaev favors his oldest daughter’s 
accession. In order for a smooth transition to take place, her opponents must be 
removed or at least discredited. Thus, it is possible that Ak Zhol, the Communist 
Party, and the Democratic Choice Parties have all been discredited or suborned 
with the specific aim of pushing Nazarbaeva and her party into the political 
forefront. Her recent statements may be part of a calculated move designed to 
bolster her public image, ensuring that she emerges as the only viable successor 
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